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Regulation and Trade of Genetically Modified Products 
Market Report
Yr 
Ago
4 Wks
Ago 7/7/06
Livestock and Products,
 Weekly Average
Nebraska Slaughter Steers,
  35-65% Choice, Live Weight . . . . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
  Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
  Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb . . . . .
Choice Boxed Beef, 
  600-750 lb. Carcass . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price
  Carcass, Negotiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feeder Pigs, National Direct
  45 lbs, FOB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass,     
  51-52% Lean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, Ch. & Pr., 90-160 lbs.,
  Shorn, Midwest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
National Carcass Lamb Cutout,
   FOB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
$81.61
146.84
117.90
135.60
67.42
48.14
65.45
       *
253.10
$80.60
130.48
113.13
154.27
73.14
49.16
72.23
80.00
212.17
$83.22
144.05
121.28
153.43
69.05
50.73
77.30
     *
230.26
Crops, 
 Daily Spot Prices
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
  Imperial, bu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
  Omaha, bu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
  Omaha, bu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grain Sorghum, No. 2, Yellow
  Columbus, cwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
  Minneapolis, MN , bu . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.03
1.94
6.73
3.21
1.92
4.34
2.05
5.56
2.98
2.15
4.67
2.20
5.66
3.41
2.24
Hay
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales, 
  Good to Premium, RFV 160-185
  Northeast Nebraska, ton . . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good
  Platte Valley, ton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good
  Northeast Nebraska, ton . . . . . . . . . . .
117.50
37.50
52.50
130.00
65.00
55.00
135.00
87.50
82.50
* No market.
The emergence of agricultural biotechnology and the
subsequent introduction of genetically modified (GM)
products into the food system have been among the most
controversial issues surrounding the increasingly scruti-
nized agri-food system. While agricultural producers have
responded to the agronomic benefits associated with the
producer-oriented, first generation of GM products and
have been adopting GM crops in increasing numbers,
consumers around the world have expressed an aversion to
food products containing GM ingredients. Consumer
opposition to GM products varies significantly both
between and within countries and is founded on health,
environmental, ethical and/or philosophical concerns about
agricultural biotechnology.
Similarly diverse have been the countries’ regulatory
responses to GM products with the issue of labeling being
a focal point in policy forums around the world. For
instance, while the United States opposes the labeling of
GM products arguing the “substantial equivalence” be-
tween the current, producer-oriented GM products and their
conventional counterparts, the European Union has intro-
duced mandatory labeling of GM products on the basis of
its “precautionary principle” and the expressed consumer
aversion to these products.  
Consumer opposition to GM products (or its lack
thereof) is often cited as the primary force behind coun-
tries’ decisions on the labeling of these products. While
consumer reaction is certainly important, there are other
factors that are also significant in shaping the regulatory
responses to products of biotechnology. In particular, given
the high volume of trade of agricultural and food products
and the intense competition between the major suppliers for
access in the world market, a country’s decision on its
labeling regime can be expected to affect and be affected
by the regulatory and labeling regimes of the other major
suppliers of the product(s) in question. Interestingly, this
strategic interdependence between the major producers of
agri-food products has been ignored by the relevant
literature.
In an article that was published in the January 2006
issue of the Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial
Organization, we examine the effect of the strategic
interdependence between countries on their regulatory
responses to products of biotechnology. In particular, we
analyze the strategic effects of national regulatory deci-
sions on labeling of GM products and identify the determi-
nants of the equilibrium labeling regimes in the countries
that have adopted the GM technology. 
Analytical results show that the equilibrium configura-
tion of labeling regimes in countries that have adopted the
GM technology depends on (1) the distribution of con-
sumer preferences and the level of consumer aversion to
GM products; (2) the size of the segregation and labeling
costs in these countries; (3) the relative productive effi-
ciency and the cost effectiveness of the GM technology;
(4) the market power of the life science companies; and (5)
the strength of intellectual property rights in these coun-
tries.
Specifically, the greater (lower) is the consumer
aversion to GM products and/or the smaller (greater) is the
size of the segregation costs associated with a labeling
regime in these countries, and/or the greater (smaller) is
the cost effectiveness of the new technology, and/or the
lower (greater) is the market power of the life science
sector, and/or the weaker (stronger) are the intellectual
property rights in these countries, the more likely it is that
GM producing countries will find it optimal to label (not
label) their products. 
While a similarity in these market and agronomic
characteristics leads to uniform labeling standards in the
GM producing regions, a divergence in the segregation
costs, productive efficiency, cost effectiveness of the GM
technology, market power and/or enforcement of intellec-
tual property rights between the different countries can lead
to different regulatory responses to products of biotechnol-
ogy. Different market and/or agronomic characteristics can,
therefore, provide an explanation for the different ap-
proaches to labeling adopted in different countries around
the world.
Note: This article is based on Veyssiere’s M.Sc. thesis at
the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. 
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